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Chapter 14
Ex Ante Knowledge for Infectious Disease 
Outbreaks: Introducing the Organizational 
Network Governance Approach
Jörg Raab, Patrick Kenis, Marleen Kraaij-Dirkzwager, and Aura Timen
 The Importance of Knowledge in Infectious 
Disease Outbreaks
The world is regularly and increasingly confronted with the outbreaks of infectious 
diseases (Smith et al., 2014). In the Netherlands, for example, infectious diseases 
are a clear health risk (Volksgezondheidenzorg.info, n.d.). In 2010, more than 
30,000 hospital admissions were related to infectious diseases and almost 18,000 
patients were treated in outpatient care facilities. Despite structural control mea-
sures (e.g., immunization programs, clean water, hygiene, and sanitation efforts), 
new infectious diseases emerge due to factors such as increased trade through glo-
balization, migration, and adaptation of microorganisms and can become serious 
public health issues. In addition to the morbidity and mortality of infectious dis-
eases, outbreaks cause societal distress and large societal costs.
The large quantity of unknown factors makes it impossible to assess such an 
occurrence’s timing, duration, or path of development in advance. Given the 
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uncertainty and complexity, the question is to what extent and how policymakers 
can prepare to control a large—possibly cross-border—infectious disease outbreak. 
In the present paper, we take up this task by advancing an approach to gain relevant 
knowledge to control the outbreak before it has taken place. This is an exceptional 
challenge for at least two reasons. First, outbreaks of infectious diseases very often 
show high complexity in the sense that they are characterized by incomplete, con-
tradictory, and changing requirements that are often difficult to recognize and 
change during their development. Second, a large number of actors are likely to 
become active in case of an outbreak of infectious diseases, because they believe 
they have a stake in the outbreak. Other relevant actors, however, might not become 
active even though others think they should have a stake in the outbreak manage-
ment. Consequently, an orderly response is unlikely and an unclear and even con-
fusing set of actors will probably form. Improving capacity to respond to outbreaks 
of infectious diseases therefore requires researchers to gain knowledge on the evolv-
ing actor set and its interdependencies.
Asserting that knowledge is simply unavailable—given the wicked conditions 
mentioned above—is not an option considering what is at stake in controlling infec-
tious disease threats (just think of the 11,000 persons who died because of an Ebola 
infection; Medaglini, Santoro, & Siegrist, 2018; Munjita, Chileshe, & Mutemwa, 
2015). Consequently, in the present paper we develop an approach to the production 
of useful knowledge for preparing the control of infectious disease outbreaks. We 
label it the organizational network governance approach, which we build on three 
main arguments: First, the response to infectious disease outbreaks can best be con-
ceptualized as an organizational network response; second, we can describe and 
analyze the structure of an organizational network using network analytical meth-
ods; and third, we can assess these networks in terms of their effectiveness in con-
trolling disease outbreaks using governance concepts. We will demonstrate our 
approach by introducing two infectious disease threat scenarios and show the value 
of conceptualizing them as crisis-response networks, analyzing them as social net-
works and assessing them from a governance perspective. In this way, we create 
available knowledge for an effective response to infectious disease outbreaks.
 The Research Context
Two fictitious but realistic scenarios of infectious disease outbreaks in the 
Netherlands
This study is based on two fictitious but realistic outbreak scenarios in the 
Netherlands: an outbreak of a New Asian Corona Virus (NAC) and an outbreak of 
the West Nile Virus (WNV). The New Asian Corona Virus is a fictive coronavirus but 
falls in the category of viruses emanating from Asia causing serious respiratory ill-
nesses such as SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome) or MERS (Middle East 
respiratory syndrome). There are no vaccinations or other preventative medicines to 
date. The virus is transmissible between humans via airborne infection or direct 
contact. There is no evidence for transmission via feces. Coronaviruses can cause 
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various diseases in animals as well as people, varying from the common cold to 
severe respiratory syndromes. In humans, coronaviruses cause about 15–20% of 
upper respiratory infections. Disease symptoms vary by virus type, but coronavi-
ruses often produce symptoms such as fever, coughing, fatigue, shortness of breath, 
and gastrointestinal symptoms like diarrhea. Some coronaviruses cause very serious 
symptoms, such as pneumonia, acute respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS), and 
multiorgan failure.
Much remains unknown about coronaviruses because they are hard to isolate. 
The first detection of an animal coronavirus in the laboratory was in 1937. Human 
coronaviruses were discovered in 1960. An outbreak of SARS-CoV (severe acute 
respiratory syndrome-related coronavirus) occurred in 2003–2004, causing over 
8000 reported patients worldwide, of which about 10% died. In June 2012, scien-
tists identified the first case of MERS-CoV infection in Saudi Arabia. The number 
of infected persons has exceeded 1800 cases globally, of which 640 have died. 
National and European systems are in place to notify and monitor important cases 
of MERS-CoV. In the Netherlands, MERS-CoV occurred in 2014 in two persons 
who travelled back from Saudi-Arabia.
The West Nile Virus is an arbovirus, which is transmitted from animals to humans 
or horses via mosquitoes (Bellini, Zeller, & van Borte, 2014; Weaver & Reisen, 
2010). Wild birds are the primary enzootic cycle of WNV, with mosquitoes trans-
mitting the virus amongst these wild birds (Bellini et al., 2014). When (climate) 
conditions permit, virus circulation may increase and spillover transmission via 
mosquitoes to humans or horses can occur. When transmission occurs, humans and 
horses usually serve as a dead-end host, meaning that not enough viral load is built 
up to infect mosquitoes. However, human-to-human transmission is possible fol-
lowing blood or organ donation from an infected donor. Although no symptoms 
occur in most human infections, in 20–30% of infections symptoms such as sudden 
onset of fever, headache, fatigue, and myalgias arise (Lim, Koraka, Osterhaus, & 
Martina, 2011), as well as gastrointestinal complaints with the risk of dehydration.
WNV can affect all ages, with high incidences among younger individuals, and 
among the elderly and immunocompromised. In addition, both susceptibility and 
the severity of the infection increase with age (Lim et al., 2011). Elderly people are 
therefore at higher risk of developing neuroinvasive disease, which may result in 
encephalitis, meningitis, or a poliomyelitis-like syndrome (Sejvar, 2014). Such out-
comes are seen in less than 1% of infections, but are significantly more debilitating 
and lead to long-term outcomes in over 50% of cases (Lim et al., 2011; Sejvar, 2014).
There is no available treatment for WNV in humans, other than supportive care 
(Sejvar, 2014), which highlights the impact the disease’s introduction may have on 
a country (Rizzoli et al., 2015). For horses, on the other hand, vaccines are available 
to protect them from developing West Nile Fever and other WNV-related outcomes 
(Bowen et al., 2014; Iyer & Kousoulas, 2013).
National and European systems are in place to notify and monitor cases/the epi-
demiology of WNV (ECDC, 2013). A vast majority of European countries have 
reported either human or animal cases of WNV in the past, for example Greece, 
2010 (ECDC, 2010); Turkey, 2010–2011 (Kalaycioglu et al., 2012); Croatia, 2012 
(Pem-Novosel et al., 2014); Italy, 2012 (Barzon et al., 2012). To date, the Netherlands 
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has had no autochthonous infections of WNV (i.e., infections acquired within the 
country) (Chancey, Grinev, Volkova, & Rios, 2014).
The two fictitious outbreaks would call for immediate responses or what is called 
outbreak management. Outbreak management is partially context specific, as con-
trol measures are related to the pathogen involved (characteristics of the virus or 
bacterium), the route of transmission (through inhalation, direct contact, sexual 
contact, oral intake), and the risk groups (related to many factors: age, immune 
response, and—very importantly—specific behavior). Risk groups can be those 
who become more easily infected due to exposure, or groups at larger risk of devel-
oping complications after an infection. It takes expertise to recognize an outbreak 
(understand the epidemiology and determine the source of infection, the mode of 
transmission, and the risk groups) and to develop effective and timely control 
measures.
In the Netherlands, it is the Public Health Act which regulates the response to 
events threatening public health in the Netherlands, including outbreak manage-
ment (Wet  publieke  gezondheid, 2017). The National Coordination Center 
Communicable Disease Control (in Dutch: Landelijke Coordinatie 
Infectieziektebestrijding, LCI), a department of the National Institute for Public 
Health and the Environment (in Dutch: Rijksinstituut voor Volksgezondheid en 
Milieu, RIVM) (later labeled the National Coordination Authority), is charged with 
coordinating actors within the response system if an outbreak involving different 
Dutch regions occurs (RIVM, 2019). The coordination of relevant actors is neces-
sary in order to control the risks associated with an outbreak as effectively (less 
morbidity, mortality, and societal unrest) and efficiently (efficient use of human and 
financial resources) as possible.
To facilitate the formulation and implementation of control measures at the pop-
ulation level, an infrastructure for analysis and decision  making is established 
(RIVM, 2012). The director of the Centre for Infectious Disease Control can invite 
the members of the Outbreak Management Team (OMT) to convene. The OMT is 
formed by a group of “fixed” experts, invited based on their personal expertise (e.g., 
communicable disease specialists, infectiologist, microbiologist, epidemiology, 
general practice; in case of a zoonotic disease, veterinary partners attend). The 
OMT is expanded based on pathogen- or context-specific needs (e.g., specific 
knowledge about risk groups, including specific veterinary expertise). The OMT 
advises the Board of Administrative Executives (in Dutch: Bestuurlijk Afstemmings 
Overleg), directed by the Director-General of the Ministry of Health. The BAO 
advises the Minister of Health on legal, financial, and political aspects of the pro-
posed control measures. The minister of Health will interact with other ministers if 
collective control measures have an effect on, for example, trade, schools, or air-
ports. Once the decision on collective control measures has been taken, the Minister 
of Health requests that the National Coordinating Authority to support actors in 
implementing the control measures with information and coordination as needed for 
an effective response.
J. Raab et al.
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Although there is a clear response system in place, it is evident that given the 
potentially broad societal and economic impact of the described scenarios, a myriad 
of actors within and outside the public health field will become involved.
The infectious disease outbreaks described are characterized by complexity in 
the sense that they entail incomplete, contradictory, and shifting requirements that 
are often difficult to recognize and change during their development. Moreover, 
numerous organizations, agencies, and other actors are likely to be involved in sig-
nificant ways. Consequently, response patterns are emergent rather than routine or 
planned (Majchrzak, Jarvenpaa, & Hollingshead, 2007).
 The Research Challenge and Theoretical Approach
Given the empirics of the diseases described above, actors search for relevant 
knowledge to control an outbreak before it takes place. More specifically, we con-
centrate on the question whether investigating the multiplicity of actors related to a 
crisis as well as the relational pattern of knowledge seeking and sharing between 
these actors provides a useful knowledge base for controlling outbreaks of infec-
tious diseases (Borgatti, Everett, & Johnson, 2018). The questions become: Who are 
the actors related to an outbreak of a specific disease, what are the patterns of rela-
tionships between these actors, and what information do these possess that are rel-
evant for controlling an infectious disease outbreak? Before presenting our findings 
based on an analysis of two fictitious disease outbreaks, we discuss our research’s 
theoretical foundation.
We propose conceptualizing a situation of an infectious disease outbreak as an 
organizational network response, in which a myriad of actors will become active 
while others stay inactive (nevertheless others expecting them to become active). 
Different types of relationships will or will not develop between these actors, result-
ing in a system of information sharing, command, collaboration, and so forth 
(Glückler & Panitz, 2016). The assumption is that this so-called organizational net-
work decisively influences the response’s development and quality. We base such 
analysis of crisis response from an organizational network-response perspective on 
the following assumptions. First, we begin our organizational network-response 
from a realist perspective and do not a priori include or exclude certain organiza-
tions that should (or should not) be part of the response. We thus widen our lens to 
include possible peculiarities of the crisis leading to improper measurement or miss-
ing important knowledge (see, e.g., Weick’s (2006) study on the WNV incidence in 
new NYC in 1999). Indeed, stakeholder analysis has become important in crisis 
response analysis, but few studies exist whose researchers examine crisis response 
from an overall network perspective (compared to ego-centric perspectives, with 
stakeholders as alters). Second, such an approach opens a perspective for studying 
the network positions and interactions between the different actors in the networks, 
thus producing knowledge about the network’s dispersion, information flow, leading 
organizations, the presence of peripheral groups, and so on (Glückler & Doreian, 
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2016). Third, such an approach serves as a basis for better understanding how col-
laboration and communication between actors can be improved (Moon et al., 2015; 
Swaan et al., 2017; Vinck et al., 2011), linking its findings to a governance perspec-
tive. We here define governance as the structures and interactive processes that steer 
actors’ activities towards a common goal (Ansell & Torfing, 2016; Kenis, 2016). 
Whereas networks describe the actors and the relational patterns between these 
actors, a governance perspective adds the question of whether and how these net-
works lead to network outcomes. Given the absence of market logic or classical 
hierarchical logic, the question becomes which mechanisms steer the network’s 
functioning. We consider these mechanisms essential to understanding how a set of 
organizations and its relational patterns function in a network form of organization. 
We here define actors, relational patterns, and mechanisms as network- level gover-
nance (Glückler, Dehning, Janneck, & Armbrüster, 2012).
The organizational network governance approach proposed here is first and foremost 
an analytical one, whose utilizers attempt to create knowledge to improve response pre-
paredness by conceptualizing the response system as a network based on actors and 
their ties. Network is thus used as an empirical tool (Raab & Kenis, 2009). As stated 
above, however, we believe that in a situation where neither market nor hierarchical 
mechanisms seem likely to work, as is the case for international infectious disease 
threats, network as a form of governance or governance tool is the most likely and 
appropriate option. Whether the most appropriate response is based on a shared gover-
nance mode, lead organization or network administrative organization (Provan & Kenis, 
2008), or a mixed form (Berthod, Grothe-Hammer, Müller-Seitz, Raab, & Sydow, 2016) 
is an empirical question and depends on several factors, of which the formal legal frame-
work in which the response takes place is likely an important one.
The organizational-network response approach resonates with recent observa-
tions in the field of crisis management. Recent research on organizational networks 
in general and their use as a tool to respond to disasters and emergencies has signifi-
cantly improved our understanding of the structure, governance, functioning, and 
effectiveness of such systems. In addition, the field of public sector networks in 
general has made important progress regarding the governance of goal-directed net-
works (Raab, van den Oord, & Kenis, 2015). Provan and Kenis (2008), for example, 
have provided the field with a conceptual vocabulary and specific lens that has 
helped researchers to better analyze the different forms of network coordination in 
general (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015; Glückler, Lazega, & 
Hammer, 2017; Provan, Fish, & Sydow, 2007; Raab, Mannak, & Cambré, 2015) 
and emergency response systems in particular (Berthod et  al., 2016; Moynihan, 
2009). In addition, the 9/11 terror attacks in New York and Washington triggered a 
whole stream of research on interorganizational response networks (Hu, Knox, & 
Kapucu, 2014; Kapucu, 2009; Moynihan, 2009; Nowell & Steelmann, 2015). The 
perspective of an organizational network-response was recently also proposed in a 
report on “New Directions in Governing the Global Health Domain” 
(Kickbusch, Cassels, & Liu, 2016). Its authors concluded that those dealing with 
health challenges will in the future need to widen their lens to include actors who lie 
outside what has traditionally been defined as the infectious disease architecture. 
J. Raab et al.
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This is due to considerable failures in responses (e.g., Ebola; Moon et al., 2015; 
Stoto & Higdon, 2015) and the increasing interdependencies in today’s world. 
Public health specialists in the Netherlands have also recognized this situation 
(Huizer, Kraaij-Dirkzwager, Timen, Schuitmaker, van Steenbergen, 2014; Kraaij- 
Dirkzwager, Schol, Schuitmaker-Warnaar, Timen, & van Steenbergen, 2019).
How, then, can one usefully describe and analyze an organizational network- 
response that results in reaction to a disease outbreak? Given the fact that we con-
ceptualize the situation as one with an a-priori unknown set of actors and among 
which the interaction has an important effect on controlling an outbreak as early as 
possible and with minimal consequences, we propose network analytical tools as an 
appropriate approach. The use of such tools goes beyond the more common map-
ping of the relevant actors and providing a generic list of all possible actors involved 
and will be introduced in the following.
We thus explore the potential governance system for these two fictitious but real-
istic infectious disease outbreaks through a network lens. Knowledge that we will 
acquire through this exploration will likely help in fighting future outbreaks in the 
following way:
 1. Which actors are mobilized? Are these all the appropriate actors? Some actors 
are frequently not mobilized because they are not part of the core actor set within 
public health, but are nonetheless crucial for outbreak management.
 2. To what extent are those that are deemed important willing to engage? Ideally, 
we would like to see actors on the diagonal, in other words, the more important, 
the more engaged.
 3. In terms of network structure, how are the relevant actors connected? If actors 
form clusters and these are connected by brokers, these brokers should have the 
competence and capacity to function in such a connector role.
 4. In terms of governance, to what extent are core health care actors well and 
densely connected in the center, collectively coordinating the response under the 
LCI’s leadership and well connected (but more sparsely) to the more periph-
eral actors?
Public health authorities can utilize these insights to develop a relational lens with 
which to analyze, structure, and manage the emerging organizational network 
response.
 Introducing Network Analytical Tools for Studying Infectious 
Diseases Responses
Network analytical tools are useful for describing the (in)formal relationships in an 
evolving crisis-response network. Insight into the outbreak networks described in 
the scenarios above provides parallel insights into the unfolding communication 
and coordination at the level of the crisis-response network.
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Network analysis is a method of collecting, analyzing, and visualizing relational 
structures and processes. The network perspective is now more than a metaphor: It 
is a systemic way for researchers to study how societies with their individuals, com-
munities, and organizations interrelate, based on and with its own theoretical state-
ments, methods, and research findings (see Borgatti et al., 2018; Rainie & Wellman, 
2012, for an overview). Proponents study and describe systems of interaction in 
terms of both their actors (called “nodes” or “vertices” in the language of network 
theory) and relationships (called “links”, “ties” or “edges”). Links can be of many 
types, such as information exchange, trust, exchange of resources, and the like. 
Networks are usually represented by data matrices and related diagrams, in which 
the units are represented by points and lines between them, either with or without 
arrowheads dependent on whether they have a direction or not.
Network analysis researchers have developed a great and powerful number of 
ways to describe networks characteristics, which we have summarized in Table 14.1.
 Measures, Data Collection, and Data Analysis
We have operationalized the data collected for the present study in order to contrib-
ute to the knowledge required to help fight future outbreaks in the following ways:
 The List of Actors in the Crisis-Response Networks
In order to mirror reality as best as possible, we used two fictive scenarios as the 
basis for our network analyses. One scenario described the early onset of a West- 
Nile Virus (WNV) outbreak with several autochthonous cases among humans and 
horses in the Netherlands. The second scenario described a rapidly evolving out-
break of a new coronavirus (NAC) after introduction through a traveller returning 
from Asia. (Full descriptions of the cases are available on request.)
Because the networks in both cases included actors from inside and outside the 
public health field, we used exploratory interviews and two focus groups with infec-
tious disease control experts (n = 6 and n = 7, respectively) to determine the network 
boundaries and to develop the questionnaire. In addition, we had to find a way to 
combine concrete organizational actors like the National Coordination Authority 
with actor groups like general practitioners, boards of academic hospitals, emer-
gency physicians, microbiologists, infectiologists, or veterinarians. With the help of 
the two focus groups we defined a relevant actor as: “any organization and/or repre-
sentative that has a positive or negative influence on the prevention, control, treat-
ment, and/or decision making with regard to (the outbreak of) the infectious disease 
at hand.” We also attributed three main characteristics to actors that influence their 
role during an outbreak: their level of influence on outbreak management (related to 
their interest in acting and potentially contributing), the amount and type of 
J. Raab et al.
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Table 14.1 Overview of basic network descriptors




Centrality Indicators of centrality identify the most important node (actors) 
within a network. Given the fact that “important” can mean 
different things (depending on the research questions) there are 
also different centrality indicators. For example we can look at 
the “importance” of an actor (e.g., who is closest to all other 
actors) or the importance of the actor in the cohesiveness of the 
network. The most commonly used centrality indicators are: 
degree, closeness and betweeness. Eigenvector centrality assigns 
relative scores to all nodes in the network based on the concept 
that connections to high-scoring nodes contribute more to the 




In a directed network, a tie is not a symmetric connection 
between two actors, but an asymmetric link, going from one 
actor to another leading to difference in prominence or prestige 
among actors. The simplest measure of prominence for directed 
networks simply breaks down the degree count for incoming ties 
(in-degree) and outgoing ties (out-degree). Many other centrality 
measures can be similarly adapted to directed networks and used 






Apart from the absolute number of ties an actor in a network can 
have specific positions in a network. An actor who is connected 
to actors who are themselves not directly connected has 
opportunities to mediate between them and the actor itself or the 
overall network can profit from this mediation.
Structural 
partitions
Communities A network is said to have a community structure if the nodes of 
the network can be easily grouped into (potentially overlapping) 
sets of nodes such that each set of nodes is densely connected 
internally. The inhomogeneity of connections suggests that the 
network has certain divisions within it. The most commonly 
used indicators for analyzing community structures in networks 




Density Density indicates the general level of cohesion in a network. It 
calculates the proportion of direct ties in a network relative to 
the total number possible. Denser networks are not by definition 
better than sparser networks. This is contingent on the research 
question and perspective. Would we like to see ‘old boys 
networks’ to be more dense or less dense?
Centralization Centralization refers to the overall cohesion or integration of a 
network. Networks may, for example, be more or less 
centralized around particular actors or groups of actors. Most 
centralized for instance is a star network.
Cohesiveness It refers to the minimal number of actors in a social network that 
need to be removed to disconnect the group. This might be 
important for understanding how social networks shape 
communities, facilitate norm maintenance, or form the basis of 
categorical group identity, among many other things.
(continued)
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knowledge and information they have available (related to their position in the net-
work), and the level of collaboration they engage in. We asked respondents to focus 
on the potential collaborations and coordination with other relevant actors in the 
Netherlands as the scenarios allowed. Based on the generic list of actors available at 
the National Coordination for Communicable Disease control, the focus groups 
identified 98 possibly relevant actors for the WNV scenario and 61 potential actors 
in the NAC scenario. We thus applied a realist strategy in determining the network 
boundaries.
We did not include nonorganized stakeholders such as infected individuals, trav-
ellers, recreational water/land users, hunters, farmers, and gardeners (i.e., specific 
risk-groups) or professionals who were already represented through other organiza-
tions (e.g., equine specialists through the Animal Health Services and Royal 
Netherlands Veterinary Association). To include a representative sample of all these 
stakeholders would mean a disproportional effort at this stage of our exploratory 
research. We excluded media for the same reason. We approached some stakehold-
ers via an umbrella organization—those we judged to be extremely relevant but 
difficult to access directly—for example: boards of the academic hospitals (via the 
Netherlands Federation of University Medical Centres (NFU)) or microbiologists 
(via the Dutch Association of Medical Microbiology (NVMM)). By asking the 
associations to select five representatives from different regions to fill in the ques-
tionnaire, we argue that a proper reflection of their information flows would be 
captured without burdening too many people. In addition, in the case of two organi-
zations—with formal tasks related to infectious disease control and disaster/crisis 
management in the health care sector—that are located throughout the Netherlands, 
all divisions were approached to obtain insights into potential regional differences 
within institutes (i.e., Municipal Health Services (GGD) and Regional Consultation 
on Acute Care (ROAZ)).
Table 14.1 (continued)
Dimension Indicator Rationale for use in empirical analysis
Connectedness The inventory of the total connections among actors is useful for 
getting a sense of how closely coupled the entire network is. 
This information can be used to understand how information 
moves in the network.
Subgraphs and 
components
This indicates that the graph can be partitioned in certain ways. 
A subgraph is a subset of the nodes of a network, and all of the 
edges linking these nodes. Any group of nodes can form a 
subgraph. Components, on the other hand, are portions of the 
network that are disconnected from each other.
Note. Reprinted from “Analyzing policy-making II: Policy network analysis”, by P.  Kenis and 
V. Schneider, 2018, in M. Puppis, K. Donders, L. van Audenhove, & H. van den Bulck (Eds.), The 
Palgrave handbook of methods for media policy research (pp.  471–491), Cham: Palgrave 
Macmillan. Copyright 2018 by Springer Nature. Reprinted with permission
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 Data Collection and Types of Ties
We piloted the questionnaire and adapted it accordingly (questionnaire available on 
request in Dutch). We first asked respondents to indicate their role(s) and potential 
contributions (unique skills and capabilities) to outbreak control, and then intro-
duced the scenarios. Second, we incorporated a list of control activities (approved 
by the focus groups of control experts) and asked respondents to indicate in which 
control activities they were likely to be involved. Third, the questionnaire contained 
a table in which we asked respondents to indicate per organization identified if they 
would obtain and/or provide information/advice from and to this organization. 
Fourth, we asked the respondents to indicate with whom of the stakeholders they 
would expect to have the most intense collaboration, plus their expectations of the 
activities the particular stakeholder would undertake. Finally, the respondents were 
asked to indicate their perceived level of influence over the outbreak control in the 
scenario provided and their level of interest in being involved in outbreak control.
We therefore based the network analysis on three types of ties: joint involvement 
in control activities, providing and receiving information/advice, and collaboration. 
For actor groups (health care professionals), we coded a tie as existent (=1) if at 
least 50% of respondents from an actor group—for example, 50% of the general 
practitioners—indicated a relationship, and did additional robustness checks, for 
example, 60% of respondents or at least one respondent.
We used Visone (Brandes & Wagner, 2004) to analyze and visualize the network 
data. We calculated general descriptive network measures for the actor level, such 
as degree, (flow) betweenness, closeness, and status. We further used the spring 
embedder algorithm implemented in Visone to identify possible clusters and visual-
ize the two mode networks of actors and measures for outbreak control in order to 
analyze how the response measures and actors are connected and between which 
actors coordination would be required. For joint involvement we used a spring 
embedder analysis to identify clusters of actors around certain control measures. 
For information/advice provision/reception we applied flow betweenness centrality 
and status, and in case of collaboration we again used the spring embedder to iden-
tify cliques and brokers.
 Data Collection
The questionnaires were sent to the representatives of the actors or selected respon-
dents from actor groups. A reminder was sent 10–14 days later. If a response still 
had not been received after 5 days, the organization was mailed or called as an extra 
reminder to minimize nonresponse. In total, in the NAC case we included 43 actors 
or actor groups in the data analysis, which represents a response rate of 80%. For the 
WNV case, we included 82 actors or actor groups in the data analysis, which repre-
sents a response rate of 82%.
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 Data Analysis
We discussed the analyses’ preliminary outcomes during a 1h focus group with 
communicable disease control specialists (medical doctors, nurses, and policy offi-
cers); public health specialists (medical doctors and policy officers); microbiolo-
gists; entomologists; researchers with an interest in crisis management, preparedness, 
and response related to infectious disease threats; and guideline developers.
 Results
In the following we present the results with actors in an anonymized form (confi-
dentiality was promised to the respondents). We present the actors who have been 
named relevant in the two settings, their involvement, and the distribution of 
information.
 Actors in the Two Networks
An important question in infectious disease outbreak response is, of course, which 
actors should be involved to manage the outbreak. This is a tricky issue. Compared 
to simple or even complicated tasks in which one could specify in advance what the 
perfect task division would be to get the task done, this is quite different when we 
are dealing with “wicked problems” (Head, 2008) or those as complex as explained 
above. Consequently, the first question researchers using an organizational network 
response approach ask is: Who is or should be part of the response system? Often, 
actors who are not part of the core of the public health system might need to be 
involved as early as possible to limit the impact of the outbreak.
The larger number of actors in in the WNV scenario is due to the fact that trans-
mission happens via mosquitos and animals and therefore a large group of actors 
becomes relevant that does not belong to the traditional (human) public health field 
such as hunters, veterinarians, water management associations, or the Ministry that 
deals with agricultural and nature issues in the Netherlands. Different actors consti-
tute the core of the response network in the NAC and the WNV scenario. For 
instance, an organization with the mandate to control mosquitoes and coordinate 
specific veterinary measures are prominent in the core of the network controlling 
the WNV outbreak.
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 Actor Involvement in the Two Networks
Here we focus on to what extent the actors have an interest in actively participating 
in the impact of the outbreak. This is an indicator for whether they see a role for 
themselves in the organizational network response. In order to answer this question, 
we created a power-interest matrix (see Fig. 14.1 above). A power-interest matrix 
combines two types of information: whether the actors see a role for themselves in 
the response and whether they are interested in playing that role. The first tells us 
something about the task allocation and the second tells us something about how 
rewarding they consider their participation or, in other words, how interested they 
are in becoming active in the response. The crosstabulation of these two dimensions 
proves particularly helpful, because it can point to the discrepancy or tension 
between the necessary task allocation and the degree of interest in performing 
one’s task.
In these figures, we show different types of actors (knowledge institutes, health 
care professionals, intermediaries, and public authorities) and their specific position 
in the power interest matrix. Some points in the matrix represent more than one 
actor of the same type. Actors are willing to indicate their self-perceived interest and 
power and differentiate their role in the scenarios (e.g., health care providers esti-
mate a larger role for themselves in the NAC scenario than in the WNV scenario). 
For coordinating parties in the response system, this provides an interesting mirror 
for their own expectations of actor involvement, a starting point for dialogues with 
actors/groups about possible fulfillment of their role in a specific context.
The power-interest matrix (above) also provides an interesting mirror for the 
actors’ own expectations of their involvement and a starting point for dialogues with 
actor(group)s, including about possible rewards and incentives to fulfill their role in 
a specific case and context.
In both scenarios, we see a general linear relationship between self-perceived 
power and interest, with the north-west quadrant remaining empty. This signals that 
many actors who think they have the most power to intervene in the transmission 
also indicate a strong interest in participating. Interestingly, there are also actors 
Power
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Fig. 14.1 Power interest matrix for the two scenarios. Source: Design by authors
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with self-perceived low power who (might) have crucial skills, assets, or capacities 
at their disposal. The actors in the northeastern quadrant can be described as the 
core actors in the response system in their self-description with high power and high 
interest. It is interesting, for example, that an organization that engages in extermi-
nation of mosquitos is very much aware of their potential role and importance in the 
WNV scenario, and that the health care professionals (yellow triangles) voice strong 
interest in both scenarios but assess their power to be much less in the WNV sce-
nario (most health care professionals are located in the southeastern quadrant in the 
WNV scenario, but appear in the northeastern quadrant in the NAC scenario).
Actors’ involvement regarding specific measures to fight and control the out-
break can also be seen as actors indicating the tasks they plan to perform in the 
outbreak scenarios. In the next two figures we depict the respondents’ answers to 
the question “in which of the following outbreak control measures is your organiza-
tion involved in this scenario.” We had identified 28 measures in the NAC scenario 
and 34 in the WNV scenario as necessary for reacting to and controlling the out-
break, from which respondents could choose. Blue squares represent actors; circles 
the different measures, which were grouped in identification of the infection source 
(pink), developing guidelines and informing health care providers and risk groups 
(yellow), developing and implementing of control measures (green), coordination, 
evaluation, and research (orange). The measures clearly represent the operational 
level of reacting to and controlling an outbreak (Fig. 14.2 and Fig. 14.3).
For the NAC scenario, we can observe nine core actors in the middle who are 
involved in taking different measures and are therefore also likely or at least could 
potentially coordinate the application of these diverse measures. However, there is 
no clear clustering of measures and actors, which means that actors and measures of 
different types are closely connected and that there are no separate actors who deal 
exclusively with specific measures. Therefore, the integration of the different types 
of measures and the measures themselves seems quite high but not very structured. 
A disadvantage of this situation, therefore, could be that it requires significant con-
scious additional coordination, which is relatively inefficient if there is no formal 
structure with mandated or natural coordinating actors (other than the National 
Coordination Authority/NCA). Ideally, some actors would simultaneously be 
involved in certain measures, and others would be specialized and involved only in 
a limited number of other measures.
In the NAC scenario, these nine core actors represent some of the most important 
public health actors in fighting an outbreak, with other actors scattered more at the 
periphery. This analysis implies that when it comes to the coordination of measures, 
it is mainly these nine important public health actors that need to reconcile their 
strategies and actions on the operational level.
In the WNV scenario, the network is characterized more by a bifurcated structure 
with some actors on one side and the others on the other, connected by different 
measures regarding information delivery and (public) communication.
As far as the task allocation is concerned, therefore, many operational tasks are 
performed in the two organization network scenarios and similar tasks are often 
performed by several organizations. These initially look like rather uncoordinated 
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systems, but to better understand the coordination of tasks in the systems we asked 
respondents to nominate up to five actors with whom they would work together 
most intensively in such a scenario regarding limiting transmission of the virus and 
its impact. This is a good indication of the division of labor which would evolve in 
the network.
In Fig. 14.4 and Fig. 14.5 below, we depict the structure based on the type of tie 
“collaboration”. The ties are directed to indicate the nomination. Red undirected 
relations (the thicker lines) indicate that both actors have nominated each other 
reciprocally. These ties, in other words, connect those groups/actors one would 
expect to have the most intense collaboration with respect to outbreak control in the 
specific scenario, and also indicate that organizations hold expectations towards 
each other about their respective roles and contributions in outbreak management.
We have visualized the network using a spring embedder algorithm, placing 
nodes in such a way that connected actors are attracted to each other and placed 
close to each other, and actors who are not connected repel each other and are 
placed further apart. Through this algorithm, network clusters become visible.
Fig. 14.2 Two-mode network based on involvement in reactive measures (NAC). Source: Design 
by authors
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For both scenarios, one can observe that a relatively dense core exists where 
actors also frequently nominate each other in a reciprocal way. Due to the higher 
number of actors, there are also more collaboration relations in the WNV scenario. 
Interestingly, a lot of directed and thus unreciprocated nominations also exist at the 
network’s core. An interesting question to follow-up is, of course, what the ratio of 
these hubs is and the ratio of the connections between the hubs. Are these hubs and 
spokes in effect confirming the law of homophily, which would imply that similar 
actors are more likely to collaborate with each other? This situation is not necessar-
ily the most appropriate one in a situation of complexity, where one would expect a 
more integrated approach to collaboration.
Fig. 14.3 Two-mode network based on involvement in reactive measures (WNV). Source: Design 
by authors
J. Raab et al.
335
 Information Distribution in the Crisis-Response Networks
Information provision is about the information actors need to perform their task and 
coordinate their work with others. In what follows, we do not analyze the need, but 
the actual nomination of which actors provide information to other actors. The 
question becomes to what extent the information provision reported contributes to 
the goal of the organizational network, in turn limiting the transmission of the infec-
tious disease and its impact.
In Fig. 14.6, we depict the network structure in a centrality layout with regard to 
the flow betweenness of the actors based on the confirmed ties “giving information/
advice” in case of a virus outbreak. Actors are regarded as central if they lie on a 
path between any two other actors. Ties are seen as pipes through which information 
can flow. The more often an actor is on such a path, the more important it becomes 
for the transmission of information. We assume that information in principle travels 
Fig. 14.4 Collaboration between actors (NAC scenario, min 1x mentioned, red lines reciprocal). 
Source: Design by authors
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on the shortest path between any two actors but that it might also travel on longer 
paths (though is less likely to do so). Therefore, the shorter the paths are, the more 
weight they receive in calculating the flow betweenness centrality.
In Fig. 14.6, we show that the communication network is relatively centralized, 
with the NCA in the most central position. Although a lot more actors are involved 
in the WNV scenario, the structures in the two scenarios very much resemble each 
other, with the Ministry of Health and the Municipal Health Agencies (actors with 
formally described roles in the Public Health Act) in the following ranks with some 
distance to the NCA. The centralization of the communication structure around the 
NCA implies a lead organization type network in terms of governance, because the 
NCA is operationally involved and clearly by far the most central actor. However, 
there are also many linkages between the other actors.
Although links between the alters are present and encouraged in the ideal typical 
model suggested by Provan and Kenis (2008) to avoid information overload in the 
Fig. 14.5 Collaboration between actors (WNV scenario, min 1x mentioned, red lines reciprocal). 
Source: Design by authors
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center and foster innovation, one might wonder how such a considerable number of 
links impact network governance. We believe this may prove a particular challenge 
when it comes to formulating a consistent message to the public and to health care 
professionals.
One possible solution for information provision and coordination is a network 
that is characterized by a central entity with more decentral hubs or brokers. With 
such a network structure, information provision and coordination can be achieved 
relatively efficiently through local hubs that each are responsible for a certain clus-
ter or section of the network. Researchers have reported on this type of solution in 
earlier studies (Lemaire & Provan, 2009; Moynihan, 2009).
In Fig. 14.7 below, we depict the structure based on confirmed ties with regard to 
giving and receiving information or advice in terms of reacting to and controlling an 
infectious disease outbreak in the NAC and WNV scenarios. Compared to Fig. 14.6, 
the actors’ prominence is not determined through flow betweenness centrality but 
by their status. In the two visualizations in the upper row, we have calculated status 
on the basis of outgoing ties; in other words, the more information ties actors have 
to other actors who again spread information to many other actors, the more promi-
nently they are positioned; in other words, these can be labeled as super spreaders, 
to use a term from diffusion theory. This is reversed for the visualizations in the 
second row. Here, actors are the more prominent the more information they receive 
from organizations that already receive a lot of information. In this way, top receiv-
ers of information can be detected.
In both cases, the NCA evidently holds the top position. A set of about 10–15 
organizations also exists that forms the top of the information distribution pyramid. 
Fig. 14.6 Flow Betweenness Centrality based on giving information/advice (confirmed ties). 
Source: Design by authors
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It becomes clear that some actors are both top information spreaders and informa-
tion receivers, such as the NCA, the Ministry of Health, and the municipal health 
services. On the other hand, some actors are primarily receivers of information. The 
questions regarding the preparedness are then: Are the appropriate actors in the 
important positions, are the knowledge institutions well connected with the actors 
that make decisions and have coordination tasks, and are any actor positions in dan-
ger of information overload?
In Table 14.2, we summarize the results for the two scenarios.
Fig. 14.7 Actor status on the basis of confirmed information ties. Source: Design by authors
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 Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper, we present the organizational network governance approach as a way 
to analyze the response to a potential infectious disease outbreak. Although similar 
approaches have been gaining ground in the recent past to analyze organizational 
responses to disasters (Kapucu, 2009; Nowell, Steelman, Velez, & Yang, 2018) and 
to infectious disease outbreaks (Bdeir, Hossain, & Crawford, 2013) in particular, 
most researchers have conducted a retrospective analysis; in other words, they look 
at the response and the structures and governance that evolved after the fact. 
However, if the field wishes to improve preparedness for often uncertain threats, it 
must find a way to assess the capabilities and capacities of a response system to deal 
with a disaster or an outbreak before an incident happens. Researchers should there-
fore ideally gain information ex ante about the potential organizational network 
response to increase preparedness.
In this paper, we have developed a specific and feasible approach to produce such 
knowledge to limit transmission of the infectious disease and its impact. We have 
based this approach, on the one hand, on the observation that infectious disease 
threats by definition provoke an organizational network-response and, on the other 
Fig. 14.7 (continued)
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Table 14.2 Summary of results
NAC scenario WNV scenario
# Actors 61 98
Type of actors Mainly core public health 
actors
Public health actors but also 
hunters, veterinarians, water 
management associations or the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs 
that deals with farming issues
Actor engagement (power- 
interest matrix): Self 
assessment, how much 
interest an organization has 
in participating in a response 
and its perceived influence 
over the outbreak control
General linear relationship 
between self-perceived power 
and interest with the north-west 
quadrant being empty, in other 
words, no actors indicating 
high power, but low interest in 
outbreak management
General linear relationship 
between self-perceived power 
and interest with the north-west 
quadrant being empty, that is, 
no actors indicating high power, 
but low interest. Several actors, 
especially groups of health care 
professionals indicating high 
interest but only medium or 
even low power in outbreak 
management
Joint involvement (spring 
embedder, two mode): In 
which control activity will 
your organization be 
involved?
28 control measures identified
Similar tasks are often 
performed by several 
organizations. 9 core actors of 
important public health actors 
that are involved in taking 
different measures and could 
potentially coordinate the 
application of these diverse 
measures. However, there is no 
clear clustering of measures 
and actors, which likely 
requires significant conscious 
additional coordination
34 control measures identified
Similar tasks are often 
performed by several 
organizations. Bifurcated 
structure with some actors on 
one side and the others on the 
other connected by different 
measures regarding information 
delivery and (public) 
communication
Collaboration (spring 
embedder): With which of 
the organization do you 
expect your organization will 
have the most intense 
collaboration?
Relatively dense core exists 
where actors also frequently 
nominate each other in a 
reciprocal way. However, also a 
lot of asymmetric nominations
Relatively dense core exists 
where actors also frequently 
nominate each other in a 
reciprocal way. Due to the 
higher number of actors, there 
are also more collaboration 
relations in the WNV scenario. 
However, also a lot of 
asymmetric nominations
(continued)
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hand, the fact that this response can fruitfully be analyzed using social network 
analysis. The fact that an infectious disease threat provokes an organizational 
network- response was confirmed by our data, which we collected for two fictitious 
but realistic scenarios of infectious disease outbreaks in the Netherlands, an out-
break of a New Asian Corona Virus (NAC) and an outbreak of the West Nile Virus 
(WNV). In both cases, respondents named a very high number of different organiza-
tions, with a substantial number of organizations outside the classical health archi-
tecture, as having a task in responding to the infectious disease threat.
Of course, such an ex ante approach with fictitious but realistic scenarios does 
not limit the need for, and usefulness of after-action assessments. Although collec-
tion of relational data might suffer from recall bias, especially if the incident is far-
ther in the past, relational data based on scenarios might suffer from a social 
desirability bias. What one might do could differ from what would happen in reality. 
However, vignette studies, which are similar to our approach, have been proven to 
Table 14.2 (continued)
NAC scenario WNV scenario




betweenness): To which of 
the organization will your 
organization provide 
information/advice, from 
which will it receive 
information/advice?
Structure is relatively 
centralized with the NCA in the 
most central position. Around 
the NCA implies a lead 
organization type network in 
terms of governance, since the 
NCA is operationally involved 
and clearly by far the most 
central actor. However, we also 
see a lot of linkages between 
the other actors
Structure is relatively 
centralized with the NCA in the 
most central position. Even 
though there are a lot more 
actors involved in the WNV 
scenario, the structures in the 
two scenarios very much 
resemble each other with the 
Ministry of Health and the 
Municipal Health Agencies 
(actors with formally described 
roles in the Public Health Act) 
in the following ranks with 




NCA holds the top position 
both in receiving and providing 
information. There is also a set 
of about 10–15 organizations 
which form the top of the 
information distribution 
pyramid. Analysis shows actors 
that are both top information 
spreaders and information 
receivers like NCA, the 
Ministry of Health, and the 
municipal health services. On 
the other hand, there are actors 
that are primarily receivers of 
information
Very similar structure compared 
to NAC scenario despite larger 
number of actors
Note. Source: Design by authors
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be a useful tool for research for some time and we have tried to minimize the poten-
tial bias in the relational data by basing the analysis on confirmed ties.
We continued our analysis by applying social network analysis to the scenarios 
of infectious disease outbreaks and arrived at several observations. We saw a large 
and highly differentiated network emerge in both cases. The network in the WNV 
scenario is much larger due to the different transmission paths (not human to human 
but via animals and mosquitoes). This results in the involvement of many more 
actors, especially those from outside the traditional (human) public health system, 
such as mosquito exterminators, water associations, and the ministry responsible for 
agriculture and nature. Attention needs to be paid to those actors that presumably 
have a strong influence but little interest. On the other hand, we can also identify 
some actors that assess themselves as having low power, although they appear quite 
important in the status analysis. The information structure is relatively centralized 
around the National Coordination Authority (NCA), which would imply a lead 
organization structure. However, in the analysis of the actor-measures structure, we 
see other actors besides the NCA as potential coordinating actors. If the NCA had 
an exclusive coordinating role, one would expect the NCA to serve as an exclusive 
connector between central measures to control the outbreak. Both networks are well 
integrated but not in a very structured way, which might lead to inefficiencies, dif-
ficulties creating a common information policy, and a risk of overburdening certain 
actors while not meeting the specific (information) needs of other actors. With our 
analysis, we show that given the structures based on various types of ties, the net-
works need additional conscious coordination efforts. But how can coordination in 
such an extensive fuzzy network of heterogeneous actors be ensured?
Looking particularly at the National Coordination Authority (NCA) in outbreak 
management reveals that respondents considered the NCA the “top receiver” and 
“top spreader” of information. Its position in the collaboration networks is, how-
ever, less clear. It is the central actor in the information sharing networks, but what 
this means for its position as the central coordinator remains a guess. This is mainly 
due to the fact that we identified several actors (and thus potential coordinators) in 
the core of those networks around the control measures. We were not able to iden-
tify the same actors as brokers in the actor networks. This might be caused by the 
large amount of interdependencies among the actors. In this study, we did not spe-
cifically ask the respondents about their thoughts on (needed) coordination. 
However, the nominations for collaborations clearly showed us that organizations 
have expectations towards each other, which could be further explored (e.g., 
Organization A expecting Organization B to perform a specific task and Organization 
B indicating that it has no role in this scenario). One possibility is that the NCA 
spreads the information actors need to perform their tasks and coordinate their work 
with others. From the information we have here, it is difficult to assess whether we 
have a “command and control approach,” a “coordination and communication 
approach,” or a “network governance approach,” in terms of Moynihan’s 
work (2009).
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The difficulty with positioning any NCA in a response network coping with an 
infectious disease outbreak might lie in the fact that the same organization needs to 
fulfill both specific operational expert tasks in the organizational network and net-
work administrative tasks (as defined by Provan & Kenis, 2008). Doing both by the 
same organization (and partly) or even by the same persons might lead to difficul-
ties. These could be in only acquiring, processing, and evaluating one-sided infor-
mation, perceived conflicts of interest or shortage of time to exhaustively fulfill both 
the operational expert as well as the monitoring and coordinating functions when it 
comes to task division and task allocation. This might lead to even more problems 
when it comes to contributing to the “integration of effort” (see Puranam, Alexy, & 
Reitzig, 2014). On the other hand, there are clear reasons for combining expert 
medical knowledge and coordination authority in an NCA. After all, it is crucial that 
the central player has immediate access to the best scientific knowledge and infor-
mation about the outbreak. Weick (2009, Chap. 4) also recognized this dilemma in 
his analysis of the WNV outbreak in New York City in 1998. Ideally, the NCA is 
positioned in such a way in the network that it has (1) perceived authority/a mandate 
to coordinate the actors, (2) sufficient time/resources to pool the available informa-
tion as impartially as possible, and (3) can recognize, monitor, and assess the evolv-
ing organizational network.
Looking at our results, one can argue that given the large size of the Dutch net-
work and the lack of “natural” integration of many actors’ efforts, the NCA can 
easily become overburdened in its attempts to facilitate all actors. There is a second 
risk: If the NCA is expected to inform and coordinate all individual actors, this 
could at least partially be in conflict with its role as an actor coordinating the orga-
nizational network.
Given the peculiarities of the evolving organizational network response in a situ-
ation of an infectious disease outbreak as well as the findings from our analysis 
above, another coordination structure to consider could be the core-periphery net-
work structure as recently introduced by Nowell et al. (2018) in their discussion on 
the structure of effective governance of disaster response networks. Scholars have 
theorized a core-periphery structure as potentially providing the benefit of both the 
cohesion and stability of a closed network while also having the flexibility for the 
network to grow and recognize the importance of new actors who become involved 
because of the disease outbreak. It might thus be especially relevant given the fact 
that an organizational network response to an infectious disease outbreak can be 
expected to consist of many different sub processes, for example integration of sci-
entific knowledge about the pathogen and risk groups with laboratory and epide-
miological processes to understand the actual outbreak, developing and supporting 
the implementation of context specific control measures, (targeted) risk communi-
cation to health care professionals and general public, and so forth. The actors 
involved are organized along other individual and network goals: for example, 
patient care or water management in the case of the WNV.  Consequently, the 
approach presented can initiate a dialogue among core actors to share information 
and reflect on the actual situation.
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 Limitations and Future Research
Looking at the recent evaluations of national and international outbreaks, we believe 
that the organizational network governance approach introduced here can strengthen 
outbreak management. At the same time, we are fully aware that this approach is far 
from complete and and researchers must address a number of important issues in 
the future.
In this study, we have in the first place focused on structure as one governance 
characteristic. This focus has produced important insights, as we have demonstrated 
in presenting our network analysis for the two scenarios. With this approach, we 
capture and visualize basic information about the actors as well as about the struc-
ture of the collaboration, knowledge, and information exchange. This explorative 
description creates a basis for practitioners and policy makers to engage in an ex 
ante assessment and identify and address possible bottlenecks and challenges as laid 
out above for the two scenarios used here. It also makes it possible to theorize about 
improving communication and governance of crisis management in general. In this 
study, we have thus understood “network” primarily as an empirical tool. But 
insights produced based on an organizational network governance approach used 
for ex ante and ex post analysis can address questions such as: Which mode(s) of 
governance and which network structures appear(s) to be most suitable for a rapid 
response to an outbreak at the (inter)national level? And which methods and data 
are most appropriate for assessing a response system ex ante or during the event in 
order to understand the needs and preferences for network-coordination?
However, the data we have collected for this study does not allow us to make any 
causal statements about the effectiveness of certain structures for the prevention 
of—or even a response to—an actual event. One way to get a step closer would be 
to run serious games/simulations with practitioners, in which certain structural 
characteristics could be manipulated and then assessed by the participants and 
observers in terms of the effectiveness of the information transmission and coordi-
nation. In the long run, studying organizational network responses and their out-
comes together with ex ante assessments should improve the field’s understanding 
of the relationship between structures, governance, and effectiveness of responses 
under different conditions and for different infectious diseases.
Future research should also unpack the relationship between governance and 
disasters and complexity in disasters in terms of authority and behavior. Given the 
absence of features related to legal autonomy and formal authority for the largest 
part of the organizational network, the question is what role authority plays in these 
situations and how this can take form. The same is the case for actors’ behavior. 
What factors actually motivate actors to take on responsibilities in the context of an 
organizational network to limit the transmission of the virus and its impact, even if 
public health is not part of their core mission and activity?
Given new global health threats and their potentially enormous impact, it is 
essential that insights are gained in which governance characteristics of the organi-
zational network produce the type of knowledge necessary for limiting the 
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transmission of the virus and its impact. This is not only vital for coordination in the 
implementation of measures coping with the outbreak, but already when a situation 
is perceived and analyzed at the start. As Weick (2009, p. 53) states, “if we spot 
flaws in collective induction, then we may find an explanation for their genesis in 
the way people are organizing. Stated more compactly, the degree of intelligence 
manifest by a network of nodes may be determined by the quality, not just the quan-
tity of its interconnectivity (Taylor and Van Every, 2000:213).”
 Appendix
The results presented in this chapter are based on research that had been conducted 
since 2015 before the Covid-19 pandemic. Unfortunately, one of the scenario’s that 
we used for the study, that is, the outbreak of a New Asian Corona Virus, actually 
came true faster than we could have imagined. The actual outbreak made us aware 
that our study is based on the implicit assumption that the outbreak of a Corona 
virus would remain a local outbreak that we would be able to contain. In March, the 
Dutch public health system was quickly overwhelmed by the speed and the scale of 
the outbreak that had been happening under the radar since late February in the 
Netherlands. Therefore, we think that the results are applicable only for the first two 
weeks in March for the actual outbreak when the system was still in a containment 
phase. Once the outbreak came into a situation of community spread and was rec-
ognized as such, the whole governance system changed significantly. Given the 
scale and severity of the situation, the response to the outbreak was located at the 
highest government level on a daily basis and the Dutch prime minister instituted an 
informal decision and coordination body that met once a week that had not been 
part of any planning beforehand.
However, even in a changed governance system, we could confirm some of the 
major findings of the study as well. First, we could see that it is essential that the 
National Coordination Authority
(1) has a perceived authority/a mandate to coordinate the actors, (2) has suffi-
cient time/resources to pool the available information as impartially as possible, and 
(3) can recognize, monitor, and assess the evolving organizational network. In addi-
tion, we could observe the difficulties we predicted for the coordination of a highly 
differentiated system of tasks and actors with overlapping activities and roles. The 
Dutch government reacted after some time mainly by centralizing the coordination 
of essential tasks such as getting protective material, distribution of ICU beds or 
testing and tracing. What the actual outbreak also confirmed was the difficult posi-
tion, the National Coordination Authority finds itself in due to the fact that it fulfills 
several different roles such as knowledge hub, coordination center, public informa-
tion organization and the public authority that issues rules and guidelines.
Most importantly, though, we have seen in the actual outbreak that in differenti-
ated democratic societies such as the Netherlands, coping with such outbreaks is not 
only an epidemiological but also a complex organizational and governance 
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challenge. The perspective we put forward in this paper therefore is very valid and 
essential and should receive the necessary attention as we move forward in this 
pandemic and prepare for possible new outbreaks of infectious diseases in the future.
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